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P.L. 111-23, The Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009 (5 comments ↓ | 15 wiki edits: view article ↓)
S. 454 would improve the organization and procedures of the Department of Defense for the acquisition of major weapon systems.
Detailed Summary
Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009 - <b>Title I: Acquisition Organization </b>- (Sec. 101) Establishes within the Department of Defense (DOD) a Director of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation, to act as the principal advisor to the Secretary of Defense and other senior DOD officials and provide independent analysis and advice on matters relating to DOD acquisition program cost estimation and analysis, as well as related defense acquisition matters as assigned by the Secretary. Establishes under such Director a Deputy Director for Cost Assessment and a Deputy Director for Program Evaluation.
Requires the: (1) Director to ensure that DOD cost estimation and cost analysis processes provide accurate information and realistic cost estimates for DOD acquisition programs; and (2) Secretary to ensure that the Director reviews acquisition program cost estimates, cost analyses, and related records for major defense acquisition programs (MDAPs) and major automated information system programs (MAISPs) of the military departments and defense agencies. Authorizes the Director to participate in and approve MDAP and MAISP cost estimates.
Requires the: (1) Director, the Secretary of the military department concerned, and the head of the defense agency concerned to disclose the confidence level used in establishing a baseline estimate for an MDAP or MAISP; and (2) Director to report annually to the Secretary, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (Under Secretary), the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), and the congressional defense and appropriations committees on DOD cost estimation and analysis activities.
Transfers to the Office of the Director the functions and personnel of the Cost Analysis Improvement Group and the Office of Program Analysis and Evaluation.
Requires: (1) the Director to review, and report to the Secretary on, existing DOD systems and methods for tracking and assessing MDAP operating and support costs; and (2) such report to be transmitted to the defense and appropriations committees.
(Sec. 102) Establishes: (1) a Director of Developmental Test and Evaluation to advise the Secretary and the Under Secretary on DOD developmental test and evaluation; and (2) a Director of Systems Engineering to advise the Secretary and Under Secretary on DOD systems engineering and development planning. Outlines related duties.
Requires such directors to jointly: (1) report to the defense and appropriations committees on activities undertaken; and (2) issue appropriate guidance with respect to DOD developmental test and evaluation and systems engineering, respectively.
Directs the service acquisition executives of each military department and defense agency with responsibility for a MDAP to: (1) develop and implement plans to ensure that the department or agency has provided appropriate resources for developmental testing and developmental planning and systems engineering; and (2) report to the directors established under this section with respect to such plans and each such director's responsibilities.
(Sec. 103) Directs the Secretary to designate a senior DOD official to conduct and oversee performance assessments and root cause analyses for MDAPs. Outlines related duties. Requires such official to report annually to the defense and appropriations committees on activities undertaken.
(Sec. 104) Requires the Director of Defense Research and Engineering to: (1) periodically review and assess the technological maturity and integration risk of critical technologies of MDAPs, and submit findings to the Under Secretary; (2) report annually to the Secretary and the defense and appropriations committees on the maturity and risk of such technologies; (3) report to such committees on additional resources required to implement the results of the review and assessment; and (4) develop knowledge-based standards to measure the maturity and risk of critical technologies at key stages in the acquisition process.
(Sec. 105) Directs the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) to seek and consider input from commanders of combatant commands prior to identifying joint military requirements. Requires the Comptroller General (CG) to report to the defense committees on the implementation of such requirement.
<b>Title II: Acquisition Policy </b>- (Sec. 201) Requires: (1) the Secretary to ensure that mechanisms are developed and implemented to ensure the consideration of tradeoffs among cost, schedule, and performance objectives with respect to DOD acquisition programs; (2) the JROC to ensure such consideration with respect to joint military requirements; (3) the Secretary to ensure that each new joint military requirement recommended by the JROC is reviewed to ensure compliance with the tradeoffs consideration requirement and the JROC requirement to seek and consider input from commanders of combatant commands; and (4) the Director of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation to lead the development of study guidance for an analysis of alternatives for each joint military requirement for which the JROC Chairman is the validation authority.
(Sec. 202) Directs the Secretary to ensure that the acquisition strategy for each MDAP includes: (1) measures to ensure competition at both the prime contract and subcontract level of the MDAP throughout its life-cycle as a means to improve contractor performance; and (2) adequate documentation of the rationale for selection of the subcontractor tier or tiers. Outlines measures to ensure such competition. Requires the Secretary: (1) to take specified actions to ensure fair and objective "make-buy" decisions by prime contractors on MDAPs; and (2) whenever a decision regarding the source of repair results in a plan to award a contract for performance of maintenance and sustainment of a major weapon system, to ensure that such contract is awarded on a competitive basis with full consideration of all sources.
(Sec. 203) Directs the Secretary to ensure that the acquisition strategy for each MDAP provides for competitive prototypes before Milestone B approval, unless the milestone decision authority (MDA) for that MDAP waives such requirement. Allows the MDA to waive the requirement only on the basis that: (1) the cost of producing competitive prototypes exceeds the expected life-cycle benefits of producing the prototypes; or (2) but for such waiver, DOD would be unable to meet critical national security objectives. Requires: (1) the defense and appropriations committees to be notified within 30 days after such a waiver; (2) the CG to be notified of such a waiver and its rationale; and (3) the CG to review such rationale, and report review results to the defense and appropriations committees.
(Sec. 204) Requires a MDA, within 30 days after receiving notification from a program manager that the MDAP is experiencing cost or schedule delays of 25% or more, to report to the defense and appropriations committees identifying: (1) the root causes of the cost or schedule growth; and (2) appropriate acquisition performance measures for the remainder of the MDAP's development. Requires such report to also include either: (1) a certification of the necessity of the MDAP; or (2) a plan for terminating MDAP development or withdrawing Milestone A or Key Decision Point A approval.
(Sec. 205) Directs a MDA who waives certain program certification requirements normally necessary before Milestone B or Key Decision Point B approval to, at least annually, review that MDAP to determine the extent to which it currently meets the waived requirements. Requires the current certification status of such MDAPs to be included in annual DOD budget justification documents.
Requires a MDA to have received a preliminary design review and conducted a formal post-preliminary design review assessment before the MDAP may receive Milestone B or Key Decision Point B approval.
Directs the MDA, for each MDAP that has not received Milestone C or Key Decision Point C approval, to: (1) determine whether or not the program satisfies specified certification components; and (2) annually review its progress in satisfying such components. Requires the current certification status of such MDAPs to be included in annual DOD budget justification documents.
Directs the official assigned oversight of performance assessment, with respect to MDAPs that are restructured after experiencing critical cost growth and certified as necessary to continue, to annually review and assess the MDAP's success in achieving adequate program performance.
(Sec. 206) Directs the Secretary, if the acquisition or procurement unit cost of an MDAP or designated major subprogram increases by a percentage equal to or greater than the critical cost growth threshold for the program or subprogram, to: (1) determine the root causes for the cost growth; and (2) terminate the program, unless the Secretary notifies Congress of the decision not to terminate. Allows such a program or subprogram to be continued only under limited conditions, including a certification that the program is essential to national security and there are no alternatives which will provide acceptable military capability at less cost. Allows a program to be restructured in a manner that addresses the root causes of the critical cost growth. Provides that when a program is restructured, the next Selected Acquisition Report for the program after the restructuring shall contain a description of all funding changes made in the budget as a result of the program's cost growth. Requires the Secretary to report to Congress on terminated programs.
(Sec. 207) Directs the Secretary to revise the Defense Supplement to the Federal Acquisition Regulation to provide guidance and tighten existing requirements concerning organizational conflicts of interest by contractors in MDAPs. Requires the Panel on Contracting Integrity (established under the John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007) to present recommendations to the Secretary on measures to eliminate or mitigate organizational conflicts of interest in MDAPs. Directs the Panel to continue to serve until at least the end of 2011.
<b>Title III: Additional Acquisition Provisions </b>- (Sec. 301) Requires the Secretary to carry out a program to recognize excellent performance by individuals and teams of members of the Armed Forces and civilian DOD personnel in the acquisition of products and services. Authorizes cash bonuses as part of the program.
(Sec. 302) Amends the Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009 to require additional discussions and recommendations within a required report from the Secretary to the defense committees on DOD implementation of earned value management.
(Sec. 303) Includes as a national security objective of the national technology and industrial base maintaining critical design skills to ensure that the Armed Forces are provided with systems capable of ensuring technological superiority over potential adversaries. Requires periodic defense capability assessments to consider the effects of the termination of MDAPs.
(Sec. 304) Requires the CG to report to the defense and appropriations committees on: (1) growth in operating and support costs for major weapon systems; and (2) the results of a review of weaknesses in operations affecting the reliability of financial information on systems and assets to be acquired under MDAPs.
Status of the Legislation
Latest Major Action: 5/21/2009: Cleared for White House.
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See Related Bills:
- The Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009 (H.R. 1830)
- The Weapons Acquisition System Reform Through Enhancing Technical Knowledge and Oversight Act of 2009 (H.R. 2101)
See Bills on the Same Subject:
Administrative law and regulatory procedures, Armed forces and national security, Congressional oversight, Department of Defense, Executive agency funding and structure, Government employee pay, benefits, personnel management, Military procurement, research, weapons development, Performance measurement, Public contracts and procurement, Technology assessment
See Bills in the Same Budget Category:
National Defense
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Visitor Comments
Mary-Anne
May 14, 2009, 1:35pm (report abuse)Just adding people won't solve this problem. MITRE does that supervision job already. I worked there years ago.
Instead, change what happens when it become clear that the price bid has nothing to do with what is paid.
For example, use Extreme Programming ideas and divide projects into discrete short deliverable parts, so bidders who bid too low, or who provide bad quality, on an early part, lose the ability to work on the later parts.
Financially reward a history of accurate cost and time estimates and high quality, rather than inaccurate estimates and low quality.
Make having a history of poor quality, late delivery, and cost over-runs, provide negative consequences for contractors in their future business with government. Make their investors and stock holders lose money from it.
Waste only stops when it becomes unprofitable.
Finally, PLEASE get rid of us having what amounts to four Air Forces who duplicate projects.
Gary Stephenson
May 25, 2009, 4:26pm (report abuse)This bill is better that its predecessor, HR.1830, which called for government involvement in subsystem make/buy decisions INSIDE a government contract. Industry perspective is that if the government wants to control a contract for a subsystem, they should let a contract for said subsystem. This objectionable aspect was thankfully removed from S.454.
gvseostud
(logged-in user) May 25, 2009, 4:33pm (report abuse)Points in favor: Directs JROC to actually check with field commanders to see if they want a weapons system.
Points against: More acquisition complexity than ever before.
AcqGuru
May 27, 2009, 1:31pm (report abuse)This bill will eliminate thousands of technical, financial, and logistical jobs from the private sector, supporting acquisition programs, which the DoD will not be adequately prepared to absorb immediately. Weapon systems acquisition will slow down considerable and more waste will be seen throughout the acquisition process because of the need to push ahead ill-managed programs.
Current Acquirer
May 27, 2009, 11:03pm (report abuse)Additional oversight, while our usual approach, doesn't really fix this, IMHO. I believe what's needed is either a) fewer programs, b) more acquisition specialists (PM, SE, Acq Log, Test, etc.), or c) both. I've spent my whole career "starting" programs, and I've never had more the 4-6 people helping me "develop the strategy" and "develop the plan" to meet oversigt requirements in phase with the dollars. We ended up making assumptions we never had time to verify, and some of them were big assumptions. I'm afraid more oversight will drive "more documentation needs" that will pull the attention of too few people away from "what needs to be done for the program"; instead their focus will be on "what needs to be done to get through the oversight to get to the program." Reform is needed, but I think an influx of trained personnel developing & implementing a thoughtful & approved program strategy is more important "where the rubber meets the road" on a program.