Spectrum Availability for Emergency-Response and Law-Enforcement to Improve Vital Emergency Services Act or the SAVE LIVES Act - Establishes the Public Safety Interoperable Communications Working Group to provide continuing advice to the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) and the Department of Homeland Security regarding public safety interoperable communications.

Declares that the 24 MHz band of spectrum allocated to public safety services should be used by state, local, and regional public safety organizations for interoperable voice and data communications. Requires the FCC to complete a specified Notice of Proposed Rulemaking regarding the 700MHz Band and issue rules allowing certain channels within the current 24 MHz band of public safety spectrum to accommodate data communications.

Requires the FCC to issue a notice of proposed rulemaking regarding the allocation for auction of the 30MHz band of recovered analog spectrum and establish specifications for a national public safety broadband network. Establishes the Public Safety Broadband Trust Corporation and requires, if no bidder is successful, granting it a license for the use of such spectrum. Specifies Corporation duties, including facilitating development of such network. Authorizes the FCC to enter into an agreement with the Corporation to guarantee loans to the Corporation. Pledges the full faith and credit of the United States for principal and interest.

Summary

This bill takes 30 MHz now slated for commercial auction and designates it for public safety, which is not helpful because public safety already has plenty of spectrum, and consumers would forgo the benefits of new commercially available spectrum. Additionally, spectrum allocated for public safety would fetch much less at auction for the federal treasury than would commercial spectrum.

The bill sets up a "working group" of first responder and government representatives who will write a report to the FCC outlining what an ideal public-private interoperable network on the 30 MHz would look like. The FCC is then authorized to auction the 30 MHz as long as all the bidders agree to use the spectrum to provide a network that matches the report's specifications. In some ways this is a lot like the Frontline Wireless proposal. If there is no bidder, however, then a version of the Cyren Call plan kicks in and a Public Safety Broadband Trust Corporation, established by the bill, can buy the spectrum using FCC loan guarantees.

Points in Favor

First, the spectrum won't just be licensed via a comparative hearing; at least it will be auctioned, which will hopefully draw out the best candidate. Second, (under the first alternative) it doesn't put the spectrum in the hands of a committee of public safety representatives, but gives it to a commercial entity with the incentives to profit by building a viable network. Having first responders outline their requirements and then having private firms bid to build is almost exactly what the UK did with its Airwave national network.

Points Against

First, why can't you do the same thing on spectrum that is already allocated for public safety? The bill could just give the FCC authority to auction off any public safety spectrum it identifies as suitable for such a network without having to touch 30 MHz of commercial spectrum.

(One point of optimism: As I read the bill, I thought, well, if this particular 30 MHz block is so important, then at least identify 30 MHz of existing public safety spectrum that can be vacated and auctioned "in exchange." Well, Sec. 402 of the bill requires the FCC and others to prepare a report "on how during the next 15 years public safety organizations can (1) end their use of Land Mobile radio spectrum below 512 MHz, and begin to use either [the new 30 MHz band, or the already allocated 24 MHz band]." Now, this is just a long-term study and not a mandate to vacate spectrum after a transition to the new networks, but it's a step in the right direction.)

The second problem I see is one of incentives. How do we make sure that the plan the working group proposes is realistic. That is, how do we make sure it's not so ambitious and costly that it would guarantee no bidders for the public safety auction? How do we make sure the working group has the same incentives as potential bidders? Perhaps their incentive will be just the opposite. They might write an impossible plan so that the Cyren Call contingency kicks in. It's true that there will be government members of the working group, and the group's plan will be made available for comment by the FCC, but we shouldn't overlook the incentives here.

One other weird aspect of this plan. The "Public Safety Broadband Trust" -- essentially a government corporation a lot like Amtrak or the Post Office -- that would be entitled to purchase the spectrum under the Plan B contingency part of the bill would be created whether there is a need for it or not.