How People Voted
31% For, 69% Against
70 votes cast
Take Action
 |
Alert Your Friends and Colleagues |
 |
Write Your Representative in Congress |
| Organize | |
|
Start A Petition |
| Save & Share | |
 |
del.icio.us |
 |
Digg |
 |
|
 |
|
 |
|
 |
Yahoo! |
P.L. 111-23, The Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009
- This item is from the 111th Congress (2009-2010) and is no longer current. Comments, voting, and wiki editing have been disabled, and the cost/savings estimate has been frozen.
Version saved on June 9, 2009, 19:50:45, by webmaster:
S. 454 would improve the organization and procedures of the Department of Defense for the acquisition of major weapon systems.
Detailed Summary
Weapons Acquisition System Reform Through Enhancing Technical Knowledge and Oversight Act of 2009 - <b>Title I: Acquisition Organization </b>- (Sec. 101) Directs the Secretary of Defense to designate an official within the Office of the Secretary of Defense as the principal advisor to the Secretary for each of the following Department of Defense (DOD) acquisition oversight functions: (1) cost estimation; (2) systems engineering; (3) performance assessment; and (4) such other functions as considered appropriate by the Secretary.
(Sec. 102) Requires the official assigned oversight of cost estimation to issue policies, procedures, guidance, and cost estimates in connection with DOD acquisition programs and major defense acquisition programs (MDAPs). Directs the Secretary to ensure that the official so designated: (1) receives all cost estimates, analyses, and studies conducted by the military departments for MDAPs and major automated information systems; and (2) is involved in all discussions relating to cost estimation for MDAPs and major automated information systems at all stages of such programs. Requires such official to: (1) disclose the confidence level used in establishing a baseline estimate for an MDAP; and (2) report annually to the defense and appropriations committees on cost estimation activities.
(Sec. 103) Requires the official assigned oversight of systems engineering to: (1) issue policies, procedures, and guidance for DOD use of systems engineering; (2) provide input on the inclusion of systems engineering requirements in the process for consideration of joint military requirements by the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC); (3) review and approve, with respect to each MDAP, the systems engineering master plan and the developmental test and evaluation plan; and (4) report annually to the defense and appropriations committees on systems engineering activities.
(Sec. 104) Requires the official assigned oversight of performance assessment to: (1) issue policies, procedures, and guidance governing the conduct of performance assessments for DOD acquisition programs; (2) periodically assess the suitability of MDAP baseline descriptions for providing a basis for performance assessment; (3) be responsible for management and oversight of records of the DOD earned value management system; (4) participate in certain MDAP program reviews; and (5) report annually to the defense and appropriations committees on performance assessment activities.
(Sec. 105) Requires the Director of Defense Research and Engineering to: (1) periodically review and assess the technological maturity and integration risk of MDAP critical technologies; (2) report annually to the Secretary and the defense and appropriations committees on such review and assessment; and (3) report to such committees on any additional resources that may be required to implement recommendations made after such reviews and assessments.
(Sec. 106) Directs the: (1) JROC to seek and consider input from commanders of combatant commands in identifying joint military requirements; and (2) Comptroller General (CG) to report to the defense committees on the implementation of such requirement.
<b>Title II: Acquisition Policy </b>- (Sec. 201) Directs the Secretary to ensure that the acquisition strategy for each MDAP includes: (1) measures to ensure competition at both the prime contract and subcontract level of the MDAP throughout its life-cycle as a means to improve contractor performance; and (2) adequate documentation of the rationale for selection of the subcontractor tier or tiers. Outlines measures to ensure such competition. Requires the Secretary to ensure that, with respect to maintenance of an MDAP, consideration is given to DOD capabilities to perform maintenance functions.
(Sec. 202) Directs the milestone decision authority (MDA) for an MDAP who waives certain program certification requirements normally necessary before Milestone B or Key Decision Point B approval to, at least annually, review that MDAP to determine its satisfaction with the waived requirements. Requires the current certification status of such MDAPs to be included in annual DOD budget justification documents.
Requires the MDA for an MDAP to have received a preliminary design review and conducted a formal post-preliminary design review assessment before an MDAP may receive Milestone B or Key Decision Point B approval.
Directs the MDA, for each MDAP that has not received Milestone C or Key Decision Point C approval, to: (1) determine whether or not the program satisfies specified certification components; and (2) annually review progress in satisfying such components. Requires the current certification status of such MDAPs to be included in annual DOD budget justification documents.
Directs the official assigned oversight of performance assessment, with respect to MDAPs that are restructured after experiencing critical cost growth and certified as necessary to continue, to annually review and assess the MDAP's success in achieving adequate program performance.
(Sec. 203) Requires certain MDA certification with respect to MDAPs that have not received Milestone B or Key Decision Point B approval, including that the program: (1) fulfills an approved initial capabilities document; and (2) is being executed by an entity with a relevant core competency identified by the Secretary. Directs the MDA to report to the defense and appropriations committees with respect to cost growth or schedule delays under such MDAPs.
(Sec. 204) Directs the Secretary, if the acquisition or procurement unit cost of an MDAP or designated major subprogram increases by a percentage equal to or greater than the critical cost growth threshold for the program or subprogram, to: (1) determine the root cause or causes for the cost growth; (2) determine whether to terminate or restructure the program or subprogram; and (3) submit such determinations to Congress. Allows a program or subprogram to be restructured only under limited conditions, including a certification that the program is essential to national security and that there are no alternatives which will provide acceptable military capability at less cost. Provides that when a program is restructured, the next Selected Acquisition Report for the program after the restructuring shall contain a description of all funding changes in the budget as a result of the program's cost growth.
(Sec. 205) Directs the Panel on Contracting Integrity (established under the John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007) to present recommendations to the Secretary on measures to eliminate or mitigate organizational conflicts of interest in the acquisition of major weapons systems. Requires the Secretary to revise the Defense Supplement to the Federal Acquisition Regulation to address such conflicts. Directs the Panel to continue to serve until at least the end of 2011.
(Sec. 206) Directs the Secretary to carry out a program to recognize excellent performance by individuals and teams of members of the Armed Forces and civilian DOD personnel in the acquisition of products and services for DOD. Authorizes cash bonuses as part of the program.
(Sec. 207) Requires the CG to: (1) review DOD use of certain mechanisms for considering tradeoffs among cost, schedule, and performance in the acquisition of major weapon systems; and (2) report review results to the defense and appropriations committees.
Status of the Legislation
Latest Major Action: 5/21/2009: Cleared for White House.
Points in Favor
(Log in to edit the wiki and be the first to show why the bill should pass!)
Points Against
(Log in to edit the wiki and be the first to show why the bill should not pass!)
Cost per :
Learn More
RSS Feeds for This Bill
Keep yourself updated on user contributions and debates about this bill! (Learn more about RSS.)
Visitor Comments
Mary-Anne
May 14, 2009, 1:35pm (report abuse)Just adding people won't solve this problem. MITRE does that supervision job already. I worked there years ago.
Instead, change what happens when it become clear that the price bid has nothing to do with what is paid.
For example, use Extreme Programming ideas and divide projects into discrete short deliverable parts, so bidders who bid too low, or who provide bad quality, on an early part, lose the ability to work on the later parts.
Financially reward a history of accurate cost and time estimates and high quality, rather than inaccurate estimates and low quality.
Make having a history of poor quality, late delivery, and cost over-runs, provide negative consequences for contractors in their future business with government. Make their investors and stock holders lose money from it.
Waste only stops when it becomes unprofitable.
Finally, PLEASE get rid of us having what amounts to four Air Forces who duplicate projects.
Gary Stephenson
May 25, 2009, 4:26pm (report abuse)This bill is better that its predecessor, HR.1830, which called for government involvement in subsystem make/buy decisions INSIDE a government contract. Industry perspective is that if the government wants to control a contract for a subsystem, they should let a contract for said subsystem. This objectionable aspect was thankfully removed from S.454.
gvseostud
(logged-in user) May 25, 2009, 4:33pm (report abuse)Points in favor: Directs JROC to actually check with field commanders to see if they want a weapons system.
Points against: More acquisition complexity than ever before.
AcqGuru
May 27, 2009, 1:31pm (report abuse)This bill will eliminate thousands of technical, financial, and logistical jobs from the private sector, supporting acquisition programs, which the DoD will not be adequately prepared to absorb immediately. Weapon systems acquisition will slow down considerable and more waste will be seen throughout the acquisition process because of the need to push ahead ill-managed programs.
Current Acquirer
May 27, 2009, 11:03pm (report abuse)Additional oversight, while our usual approach, doesn't really fix this, IMHO. I believe what's needed is either a) fewer programs, b) more acquisition specialists (PM, SE, Acq Log, Test, etc.), or c) both. I've spent my whole career "starting" programs, and I've never had more the 4-6 people helping me "develop the strategy" and "develop the plan" to meet oversigt requirements in phase with the dollars. We ended up making assumptions we never had time to verify, and some of them were big assumptions. I'm afraid more oversight will drive "more documentation needs" that will pull the attention of too few people away from "what needs to be done for the program"; instead their focus will be on "what needs to be done to get through the oversight to get to the program." Reform is needed, but I think an influx of trained personnel developing & implementing a thoughtful & approved program strategy is more important "where the rubber meets the road" on a program.