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P.L. 111-23, The Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009
- This item is from the 111th Congress (2009-2010) and is no longer current. Comments, voting, and wiki editing have been disabled, and the cost/savings estimate has been frozen.
Version saved on May 8, 2009, 07:43:56, by webmaster:
S. 454 would improve the organization and procedures of the Department of Defense for the acquisition of major weapon systems.
Detailed Summary
Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009 - <b>Title I: Acquisition Organization </b>- (Sec. 101) Requires a report from: (1) the service acquisition executive of each military department to the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (Under Secretary) describing major weapon system strategy and engineering capabilities of their department; and (2) the Under Secretary to the congressional defense committees on the system engineering capabilities of the Department of Defense (DOD).
(Sec. 102) Establishes within DOD a Director of Developmental Test and Evaluation to advise the Secretary of Defense and the Under Secretary on DOD developmental test and evaluation. Outlines related duties. Requires the: (1) Director to report annually to Congress on the developmental test and evaluation activities of the major defense acquisition programs (MDAPs) and major automated information system programs of DOD; and (2) departmental service acquisition executives to report to the Director on the extent to which the test organizations of their department have in place, or have effective plans to develop, adequate numbers of development test and evaluation personnel with appropriate expertise.
(Sec. 103) Requires the Director of Defense Research and Engineering to: (1) periodically review and assess the technological maturity and integration risk of critical technologies of MDAPs, and submit review and assessment findings to the Under Secretary; (2) report annually to the Secretary and Congress on the maturity and risk of such technologies; and (3) report to the defense and appropriations committees on additional resources required to implement DOD system critical technology assessments.
(Sec. 104) Establishes within DOD a Director of Independent Cost Assessment to advise the Secretary, Under Secretary, and Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) on cost estimation and analyses for DOD acquisition programs. Outlines related duties. Requires the: (1) Secretary of each military department to report promptly to such Director the results of all MDAP cost estimates, analyses, and studies conducted by that department; (2) Director to report annually to the Secretary, each Under Secretary, and Congress summarizing DOD cost estimation and analysis activities; and (3) Director to review existing DOD systems and methods for tracking and assessing operating and support costs on MDAPs, and submit review findings to the Secretary, who shall submit such findings to the defense and appropriations committees.
(Sec. 105) Directs the Joint Requirements Oversight Council to seek and consider input from commanders of combatant commands prior to identifying joint military requirements.
<b>Title II: Acquisition Policy </b>- (Sec. 201) Requires the: (1) Secretary to develop and implement mechanisms to ensure the consideration of trade-offs between major weapon system cost, schedule, and performance; and (2) Under Secretary to ensure that DOD guidance on MDAPs requires the milestone decision authority to conduct an analysis of alternatives during the material solution analysis phase of each MDAP.
(Sec. 202) Requires the milestone decision authority for an MDAP to have received a preliminary design review and conducted a formal post-preliminary design review assessment before an MDAP may receive Milestone B or Key Decision Point B approval. Directs the Under Secretary to ensure that DOD guidance on MDAPs requires a critical design review and a formal post-critical design review assessment for each MDAP.
(Sec. 203) Requires the Secretary to: (1) ensure that each MDAP acquisition plan includes measures to maximize competition at both the prime contract and subcontract level throughout the MDAP's life cycle; and (2) modify current DOD acquisition regulations to ensure competitive prototyping for MDAPs.
(Sec. 204) Requires the Secretary to terminate an MDAP that meets or exceeds its critical cost growth threshold, unless the Secretary determines that the program's continuation is essential to national security and certifies such fact to Congress. Outlines additional requirements with respect to such certification.
(Sec. 205) Directs the: (1) Under Secretary to revise the Defense Supplement to the Federal Acquisition Regulation to address organizational conflicts of interests by contractors in the acquisition of major weapon systems; and (2) Secretary to establish within DOD the Organizational Conflict of Interest Review Board to advise the Under Secretary on policies relating to such conflicts of interest.
(Sec. 206) Requires the Secretary to carry out a program to recognize excellent performance by individuals and teams of members of the Armed Forces and civilian DOD personnel in the acquisition of products and services. Authorizes cash bonuses as part of the program.
Status of the Legislation
Latest Major Action: 5/7/2009: Held at the desk.
Points in Favor
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Points Against
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Visitor Comments
Mary-Anne
May 14, 2009, 1:35pm (report abuse)Just adding people won't solve this problem. MITRE does that supervision job already. I worked there years ago.
Instead, change what happens when it become clear that the price bid has nothing to do with what is paid.
For example, use Extreme Programming ideas and divide projects into discrete short deliverable parts, so bidders who bid too low, or who provide bad quality, on an early part, lose the ability to work on the later parts.
Financially reward a history of accurate cost and time estimates and high quality, rather than inaccurate estimates and low quality.
Make having a history of poor quality, late delivery, and cost over-runs, provide negative consequences for contractors in their future business with government. Make their investors and stock holders lose money from it.
Waste only stops when it becomes unprofitable.
Finally, PLEASE get rid of us having what amounts to four Air Forces who duplicate projects.
Gary Stephenson
May 25, 2009, 4:26pm (report abuse)This bill is better that its predecessor, HR.1830, which called for government involvement in subsystem make/buy decisions INSIDE a government contract. Industry perspective is that if the government wants to control a contract for a subsystem, they should let a contract for said subsystem. This objectionable aspect was thankfully removed from S.454.
gvseostud
(logged-in user) May 25, 2009, 4:33pm (report abuse)Points in favor: Directs JROC to actually check with field commanders to see if they want a weapons system.
Points against: More acquisition complexity than ever before.
AcqGuru
May 27, 2009, 1:31pm (report abuse)This bill will eliminate thousands of technical, financial, and logistical jobs from the private sector, supporting acquisition programs, which the DoD will not be adequately prepared to absorb immediately. Weapon systems acquisition will slow down considerable and more waste will be seen throughout the acquisition process because of the need to push ahead ill-managed programs.
Current Acquirer
May 27, 2009, 11:03pm (report abuse)Additional oversight, while our usual approach, doesn't really fix this, IMHO. I believe what's needed is either a) fewer programs, b) more acquisition specialists (PM, SE, Acq Log, Test, etc.), or c) both. I've spent my whole career "starting" programs, and I've never had more the 4-6 people helping me "develop the strategy" and "develop the plan" to meet oversigt requirements in phase with the dollars. We ended up making assumptions we never had time to verify, and some of them were big assumptions. I'm afraid more oversight will drive "more documentation needs" that will pull the attention of too few people away from "what needs to be done for the program"; instead their focus will be on "what needs to be done to get through the oversight to get to the program." Reform is needed, but I think an influx of trained personnel developing & implementing a thoughtful & approved program strategy is more important "where the rubber meets the road" on a program.