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P.L. 110-261, The FISA Amendments Act of 2008
- This item is from the 110th Congress (2007-2008) and is no longer current. Comments, voting, and wiki editing have been disabled, and the cost/savings estimate has been frozen.
Comparing revision saved on July 10, 2008, 19:30:50 (webmaster), with revision saved on September 11, 2008, 10:05:44 (webmaster):
H.R. 6304 would amend the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 to establish a procedure for authorizing certain acquisitions of foreign intelligence.
== Detailed Summary ==
<summary>
(Log<b>(This measure has not been amended since it was introduced. The summary has been expanded because action occurred on the measure.)</b>
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 Amendments Act of 2008 or FISA Amendments Act of 2008 - <b>Title I: Foreign Intelligence Surveillance</b> - (Sec. 101) Amends the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA) to add a new title concerning additional procedures for acquiring the communications of certain persons outside the United States.
Authorizes the Attorney General (AG) and Director of National Intelligence (DNI) to jointly authorize, for periods up to one year, the targeting (electronic surveillance) of persons located outside the United States in order to editacquire foreign intelligence information, under specified limitations, including: (1) prohibiting an acquisition intentionally targeting a person reasonably believed to be outside the wikiUnited States in order to acquire the communications of a specific person reasonably believed to be inside the United States; and (2) requiring the targeting to be conducted in a manner consistent with the firstfourth amendment to the Constitution. Requires: (1) certain targeting and minimization procedures to be followed; (2) the AG to adopt guidelines to ensure that such limitations and procedures are followed; (3) the AG to submit such guidelines to the congressional intelligence and judiciary committees and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (Court) for review; and (4) prior to such targeting, a certification by the AG and DNI as to the necessity of such targeting and that appropriate procedures and limitations will be followed. Allows the AG and DNI, if immediate targeting is determined to be required due to an emergency situation, to commence such targeting, but to submit the certification within seven days of such determination. Requires all certifications to be submitted to the Court for review.
Authorizes the AG and DNI to direct an electronic communication service provider to: (1) immediately provide the government with all information, facilities, and assistance necessary to accomplish an acquisition; and (2) maintain under security procedures any records concerning such acquisition. Outlines legal procedures with respect to directive challenges, standards for review, enforcement, and appeals. Provides for: (1) judicial review of certifications and targeting and minimization procedures; and (2) review of Court rulings by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review (with certiorari to the Supreme Court). Outlines conditions under which the AG and DNI may, through the Court: (1) replace a detailed summarytargeting acquisition already in effect before the enactment of this Act with an acquisition authorized under this Act; or (2) reauthorize a current acquisition under the bill!)procedures and guidelines of this Act. Requires Court maintenance and security of records and proceedings with respect to acquisition applications, orders, appeals, and determinations.
Requires the AG and DNI, at least every six months, to: (1) assess compliance with required targeting and minimization procedures and related guidelines; and (2) submit assessment results to the Court and the intelligence and judiciary committees. Authorizes inspectors general of the Department of Justice (DOJ) and elements of the intelligence community (IC) authorized to acquire foreign intelligence information to review their agency or element's compliance with such procedures and guidelines and provide review results to the AG, the DNI, and the intelligence and judiciary committees. Requires the head of any IC element conducting an acquisition of foreign intelligence information to annually review such acquisitions and report review results to the Court, the AG, the DNI, and the intelligence and judiciary committees.
Provides Court jurisdiction for approving the targeting of a U.S. person located outside the United States when the acquisition of information is conducted inside the United States. Requires an application for such acquisition to be made by a federal officer (and approved by the AG), and to contain certain requirements, including that the target is believed to be a foreign power or agent, officer, or employee of a foreign power. Provides for judicial review of a Court order approving such an acquisition. Makes approval orders effective for 90 days, with authorized 90-day renewals. Allows the AG to authorize an emergency acquisition of such a target under certain circumstances, including: (1) determining that an emergency exists; (2) informing a Court judge of such determination; and (3) applying within seven days for a Court order authorizing such surveillance. Provides similar Court jurisdiction and outlines similar procedures for the acquisition (and emergency acquisition) by an IC element of a physical search.
Authorizes the: (1) joint applications and concurrent approvals of requests for acquisitions proposed to be conducted both inside and outside the United States; and (2) concurrent authorizations of electronic surveillance and physical searches.
Directs the AG to report semiannually to the intelligence and judiciary committees concerning the implementation of acquisition requirements.
(Sec. 102) States that, other than by express statutory authorization, FISA and the procedures of chapters 119 (Wire and Electronic Communications Interception and Interception of Oral Communications), 121 (Stored Wire and Electronic Communications and Transactional Records Access), and 206 (Pen Registers and Trap and Trace Devices) of the federal criminal code shall be the exclusive means by which electronic surveillance and the interception of domestic wire, oral, or electronic communications may be conducted.
(Sec. 103) Requires the AG to submit semiannually to the intelligence committees copies of any orders of the Court or the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review that include significant construction or interpretation of FISA, including any such orders issued during the five-year period before the enactment of this Act. Allows for the redaction of submitted materials for the protection of national security.
(Sec. 104) Revises provisions concerning the application for, and issuance of, Court orders, including provisions concerning paperwork requirements and government officials who may authorize FISA actions.
(Sec. 105) Allows the AG to authorize the emergency employment of electronic surveillance if the AG, among other things: (1) determines that an emergency exists; (2) informs a Court judge of such determination; and (3) applies for a Court order authorizing such surveillance.
(Sec. 107) Provides similar revisions and outlines similar procedures as in sections 104 and 105 above for the emergency employment of physical searches.
(Sec. 108) Requires the AG, after authorizing the installation and use of a pen register or trap and trace device on an emergency basis, to apply to the Court for an authorization order within seven days (current law requires 48 hours) after the emergency installation and use.
(Sec. 109) Authorizes the Court to sit en banc when: (1) necessary to secure or maintain uniformity of Court decisions; or (2) the proceeding involves a question of exceptional importance.
(Sec. 110) Authorizes the acquisition of foreign intelligence information from an entity not substantially composed of U.S. persons that is engaged in the international proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, or in activities in preparation therefor on behalf of a foreign power.
<b>Title II:</b> <b>Protections for Electronic Communication Service Providers </b>- (Sec. 201) Prohibits any federal or civil action against any person (including an electronic communication service provider or a landlord or custodian) providing surveillance assistance to an IC element if the AG certifies that such assistance was: (1) provided pursuant to an order or directive under FISA; (2) in connection with an intelligence activity authorized by the President during the period beginning on September 11, 2001, and ending on January 17, 2007, and designed to detect or prevent a terrorist attack against the United States; (3) the subject of a written request from the AG or IC element head to the provider indicating that the activity was authorized by the President and determined to be lawful; or (4) not provided. Allows for the judicial review of such certifications. Limits certification disclosure for national security purposes. Prohibits state law preemption of the protections afforded assistance providers under this section. Requires semiannual reports from the AG to the intelligence and judiciary committees on the implementation of this title.
<b>Title III: Review of Previous Actions </b>- (Sec. 301) Directs the inspectors general of DOJ, the Office of the DNI, the National Security Agency (NSA), the Department of Defense (DOD), and any other IC element that participated in the President's Surveillance Program (a program authorized by the President during the period beginning on September 11, 2001, and ending on January 17, 2007, and including the program commonly known as the Terrorist Surveillance Program) to: (1) conduct a review of, among other things, the establishment, implementation, product, and use of the product of the Program; and (2) provide an interim and final review report to the intelligence and judiciary committees. Allows for, in conjunction with such reviews, expedited security clearances and the hiring of necessary additional personnel.
<b>Title IV: Other Provisions</b> - (Sec. 401) Provides severability protections for this Act and its amendments.
(Sec. 403) Repeals FISA provisions made inconsistent by provisions of this Act.
(Sec. 404) Outlines transition procedures.
</summary>
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== Status of the Legislation ==
<status>
Latest Major Action: 7/9/2008: Presented to President.
</status>
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== Points in Favor ==
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== Points Against ==
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Visitor Comments 
Can't Be Fooled
July 7, 2008, 10:48am (report abuse)FISA wiretap laws were created as a result of presidential abuse in the past. They knew it was a crime. But the telecoms which are granted huge government contracts (some illegally) felt it was OK to comply. AT&T is the biggest conspirator in the game and not only cooperates, but develops systems (without being asked to do so) which have created the infrastructure for our newly developing police state. President Bush has never lobbied so hard for any other issue than he has for telco immunity. Why is that? because if the telcos are held responsible for their crimes, it would send a chilling message to all of the other companies who are engaged in the creation of a police state that we don't know about (yet) and would effectively set back their plan for decades. Mr. Bush understands this very well. The second, and more important aspect of his lobbying efforts are related to self-protection. He understands that if the telcos escape judicial scrutiny.
Lowell Faubion
July 7, 2008, 2:45pm (report abuse)I oppose this bill,because it is against the constitution of the United States.It does away with the fourth amendment to the constitution. Thank you.
mr. smith
July 7, 2008, 6:20pm (report abuse)*chuckle* No, thank you. Break the Constitution on someone else's watch.
LTC_SGA
July 9, 2008, 12:01am (report abuse)Having been part of the "ops" side of the house people don't realize this bill is for the bad guys, not regular people who have nothing to hide or are not engaged in big time foreign espionage. My question is-why are you so paranoid?
The Warden
July 11, 2008, 3:30am (report abuse)Paranoia has nothing to do with it. This law violates not one, but two clauses of the Constitution: Amendment IV, the searches and seizures provision; and Article I, section 9, which prohibits Congress from passing ex post facto (i.e., retroactive) laws.
The definition of "bad guys" is adjustable at the convenience of the Administration. The FISA Amendments Act 2008 is the nose under the camel's tent for total erasure of the Fourth Amendment.
klapa
July 11, 2008, 1:32pm (report abuse)Couldn't agree with Warden more - whatever administration is in power will use these laws to spy on anyone they please. Just look at the main reason the law was enacted in the first place - Richard Nixon wiretapping his political enemies.
John Deeds
July 27, 2008, 11:13pm (report abuse)This Bill that became Law, is so muddied down in twists and turns, that it is difficult for the average reader to forget that it is an 'amendment' to a CIA needed Law from 1978. It only seems to effect certain Americans who are 'abroad' and who suspected of some crime worthy of being bugged and mugged--abroad! Remember that the CIA has 'no power' within the USA!
Nevertheless, I would be against this Law (too late to appeal it for us--and 'they' aren't about to change it, because that is how these types of under-handed Bills become Law, as they know that we American voters are asleep at the wheel anyway)due to the ease by which the CIA and the AG can obtain the powers to have a free hand at taping and mugging someone 'of interest.'
'Just don't travel beyond the USA, and you'll be all right. Welcome to this Brave New World.
Dee Frances
November 2, 2008, 12:22pm (report abuse)If you haven't been watching this bill/law lately, take a look at the
whitehouse.gov site.
On Oct. 7th, Bush made changes to this law by EXECUTIVE ORDER. Now, the people charged to oversee this do not have to be 'approved' by the Congress.
They are appointed and in lower positions (Deputy Director of the FBI - Not the director....)
I think someone is stacking the government to have his people still doing his bidding!!!
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