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H.R. 3773, The RESTORE Act of 2007
- This item is from the 110th Congress (2007-2008) and is no longer current. Comments, voting, and wiki editing have been disabled, and the cost/savings estimate has been frozen.
Comparing revision saved on January 15, 2008, 19:05:52 (webmaster), with revision saved on February 13, 2008, 19:16:04 (webmaster):
H.R. 3773 would amend the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 to establish a procedure for authorizing certain acquisitions of foreign intelligence.
== Detailed Summary ==
<summary>
Responsible Electronic Surveillance That is Overseen, Reviewed, and Effective Act of 2007 or RESTORE Act of 2007 - (Sec. 2) Amends the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA) to provide that a court order is not required for electronic surveillance directed at the acquisition of communication between persons that are not known to be U.S. persons and are reasonably believed to be located outside the United States for collecting foreign intelligence information, whether or not the communication passes through the United States or the surveillance device is located within the United States. Provides procedures for the treatment of a communication in which one party is located inside the United States or is a U.S. person. Allows the acquisition by court order (through the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (Court)) or by emergency authorization (both provided under this Act) of surveillance directed upon a person outside the United States who is a non-U.S. person.
(Sec. 3) Authorizes the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) and the Attorney General (AG) to jointly apply to the Court for an order, or the extension of an order, authorizing for up to one year the acquisition of communications for foreign intelligence purposes of persons outside the United States who are non-U.S. persons who may be communicating with persons inside the United States. Outlines application requirements. Requires the Court judge to review and approve such application, if found reasonable in its purposes, within 15 days.
(Sec. 4) Allows the DNI and the AG to authorize the acquisition of communications of persons outside the United States who are non-U.S. persons who may be communicating with persons inside the United States for up to 45 days (without prior Court order) if an emergency situation exists, but requires the DNI and the AG, within seven days of such authorization, to apply to the Court for approval of the acquisition. Requires the AG to provide to any person directed to provide assistance with respect to the acquisition of information (such as a communications service provider) a document setting forth the parameters of the directive and a certification that the emergency authorization has been obtained pursuant to FISA requirements.
(Sec. 5) Requires: (1) the DNI and AG to submit to the congressional intelligence and judiciary committees copies of all applications and orders submitted to, or granted by, the Court; (2) regular audits by the Inspector General of the Department of Justice (IG) of such applications and orders; (3) regular reports from the DNI and AG to the intelligence and judiciary committees on acquisitions conducted under such applications and orders, including incidents of noncompliance; and (4) annual reports from the DNI and the AG containing the number of emergency authorizations of acquisitions and a description of any incidents of noncompliance.
(Sec. 6) Prohibits the contents of communications acquired under sections 3 and 4 above from being disclosed or disseminated with information that identifies a U.S. person unless a Senior Executive Service officer or employee determines that the identity is necessary to: (1) understand the foreign intelligence collected or to assess its importance; and (2) protect the national security of the United States or its citizens, employees, officers, or Armed Forces.
(Sec. 7) Authorizes the Court, in its discretion, to sit <i>en banc</i> to review applications and issue orders.
(Sec. 8) Authorizes an increase, from 11 to 15, in the number of Court judges. Requires Court judges to make a determination within 24 hours after the receipt of applications for emergency surveillance authorizations under FISA.
(Sec. 9) States that FISA shall be the exclusive means by which electronic surveillance may be conducted for the purpose of gathering foreign intelligence information. Requires specific authorization for any exceptions.
(Sec. 10) Authorizes electronic surveillance without a warrant when Congress: (1) issues a declaration of war; (2) issues an authorization for the use of military force that explicitly authorizes electronic surveillance; or (3) is unable to convene due to attack upon the United States.
(Sec. 11) Directs the IG to: (1) audit all federal programs involving the acquisition of communications conducted without a court order on or after September 11, 2001, including under the Terrorist Surveillance Program; and (2) report audit results to the intelligence and judiciary committees.
(Sec. 12) Requires the DNI and AG to: (1) develop and maintain a recordkeeping system on instances where the identity of a U.S. person whose communications were acquired was disclosed by an element of the intelligence community to other federal departments and agencies; and (2) report to the intelligence and judiciary committees on such system.
(Sec. 13) Authorizes appropriations to the Department of Justice (DOJ) and National Security Agency (NSA) for the processing and implementation of Court applications and orders, audit and report requirements, and the recordkeeping system required under this Act. Authorizes additional personnel, for the preparation and consideration of applications for orders approving electronic surveillance, for: (1) the National Security Division within DOJ; (2) the DNI; and (3) the Court.
(Sec. 14) Directs the AG to develop and implement a secure, classified document management system for the preparation, modification, and review of electronic surveillance applications under FISA.
(Sec. 15) Requires the DNI to: (1) establish procedures for conducting and seeking approval of electronic surveillance, physical search, and the installation of wiretap devices on an emergency basis, and for preparing and submitting applications under FISA; and (2) prescribe related training for appropriate personnel of the intelligence community with respect to such matters.
(Sec. 16) Directs the President, within seven days after the enactment of this Act, to fully inform each member of the intelligence committees concerning: (1) NSA's Terrorist Surveillance Program; and (2) any similar program in existence since September 11, 2001, which involves electronic surveillance of U.S. persons in the United States for foreign intelligence or other purposes without full compliance with FISA requirements or similar requirements under title 18, United States Code.
(Sec. 18) Terminates the amendments made by this Act on December 31, 2009, with the exception that any authorization for the acquisition of communications of persons outside the United States who are non-U.S. persons shall continue through the date of the expiration of that Court order. Terminates acquisition authorizations made before the date of enactment of this Act on the earlier of: (1) the date of expiration of such authorization; or (2) 180 days after the date of enactment of this Act. Requires a report from the DNI and the AG concerning the latter authorizations.
(Sec. 20) Prohibits a person from being prosecuted, tried, or punished under FISA for any offense unless the indictment is found or the information is instituted not later than ten years after commission of the offense.
(Sec. 21) States that this Act and its amendments shall not be construed to prohibit surveillance of, or grant any rights to, an alien not permitted to be in or remain in the United States.
(Sec. 22) States that this Act and its amendments shall not be construed to prohibit the intelligence community from conducting lawful surveillance to: (1) prevent Osama Bin Laden, al Qaeda, or any other terrorist organization from attacking the United States, any U.S. person, or any U.S. ally; (2) ensure the safety of members of the Armed Forces or federal officers or employees involved in protecting U.S. national security; (3) protect the United States, any U.S. person, or any U.S. ally from threats posed by weapons of mass destruction or other threats to national security.
</summary>
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== Status of the Legislation ==
<status>
Latest Major Action: 12/3/2007: Received2/12/2008: Passed/agreed to in the Senate. Read twice. Placed onStatus: Passed Senate Legislative Calendar under General Orders. Calendar No. 517.with an amendment by Unanimous Consent.
</status>
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== Points in Favor ==
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== Points Against ==
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Visitor Comments
qkslvrwolf
October 25, 2007, 1:36pm (report abuse)The summary of this bill, while it notes that it protects corporations from lawsuits for complying with executive branch requests, doesn't note that those requests no longer would require judicial oversight. Hence the hatred of this bill.